مدیریت ارتباط با خریداران مزایای قدرت: نقش تامین کنندگان تاکتیک های تضمینی در همکاری های بلند مدت خریدار و  تامین کننده  Managing relationships with power advantage buyers: The role of supplier initiated bonding tactics in long-  term buyer–supplier collaborations

1. Introduction In interorganizational relationships, collaboration utilizing a joint project approach is becoming increasingly popular (Shenhar, Dvir, Levy, & Maltz, 2001). The success of joint projects is often dependent on effectively coordinating relevant mechanisms and long-term collaboration between the collaborative partners. If the software industry is taken as an example, implementation and maintenance of software systems usually require substantial project duration as well as combined efforts in a variety of specializations. Strong interorganizational and long-term relationships can even serve as functional substitutes for hierarchy (Baker, 1990). Informal long-term exclusive ties between a firm and a single partner are very common and can persist over a very long period, instead of establishing a hierarchical organization (Baker, 1990). For example, McDonalds and Coca-Cola both target young consumers and engage in joint planning at multiple levels without a formal written contract, preferring a partnership alliance. Interorganizational long-term collaboration can ensure stable flows of critical resources between the exchange partners (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Key pivotal factors determine long-term collaboration in the business-to-business context (e.g. Cannon, Doney, Mullen, & Petersen, 2010; Ganesan, 1994; Ryu, Park, & Min, 2007; Wang, Shi, & Barnes, 2015). Among these factors, power asymmetry is a salient determinant for the reason that power is presupposed to be asymmetrically distributed between exchange partners in supply chain relationships (Nyaga, Lynch, Marshall, & Ambrose, 2013). Research on power asymmetry in the business-to-business context mainly focuses on power asymmetry’s impact on relationship continuity (Kim, 2000; Nyaga et al., 2013; Ryu et al., 2007), trust (Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1998), solidarity of a dyad (Hu & Sheu, 2005; Kim, 2000), satisfaction (Benton & Maloni, 2005), and performance (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). The extant literature, however, provides contrasting findings regarding the effect of power asymmetry on long-term collaboration. Some scholars argue that power-advantaged firms are less likely to develop long-term orientation because they always obtain their own interests through exercising their power over the weaker counterpart (Ryu et al., 2007). In contrast, other researchers contend that power asymmetry may promote collaborative behavior between exchange partners. Specifically, the poweradvantaged firm with expert and referent power tends to signal its reputation, credibility and value to the weaker partner, thus facilitating interorganizational collaboration (Nyaga et al., 2013). In this sense, whether power asymmetry deters or promotes internorganizational long-term collaboration depends on power sources (Nyaga et al., 2013). Such conflicting findings indicate that there is a research gap and that further investigation of the relationship between power asymmetry and long-term collaboration should be undertaken. Moreover, relatively few studies explore a situation in which a power-advantaged actor is reluctant to maintain a long-term relationship with the power-disadvantaged actor. Thus, it is crucial to examine what actions the power-disadvantaged actor should take to offset the above effect. Addressing this question is essential as it not only provides theoretical extension of resource dependence theory, but also provides practical implications for low power firms.