اثرات تعهد مدیریت منابع انسانی در استخدام و رتبه بندی آنلاین کارکنان Signaling or experiencing: Commitment HRM effects on recruitment and employees’ online ratings

1. Introduction The Internet has moved those boundaries by collapsing time and distance in the information communication dimensions of markets. (Spence, 2002: 435) Information flow is central to markets (Etzion & Pe’er, 2014), and information on firms’ human resource management (HRM, hereafter) flows extensively and continuously on diverse websites. It is reported that firm websites provide more detailed information regarding jobs and HRM than other sources such as brochures and advertisements (Cober, Brown, Keeping, & Levy, 2004), and that a firm’s website is where individuals first seek and acquire firm information (e.g., Jones, Willness, & Madey, 2014; Peters, 2001). Nowadays, employees also actively dispatch their opinions on firms’ management on websites (e.g., Glassdoor in the US). Accordingly, information on firms’ HRM has proliferated rapidly online, but basically no knowledge has been accumulated regarding their associations: Are they delivering consistent messages? Are they contradictory? What factors influence signals sent by firms and by employees? Signaling theory provides a persuasive tool for analyzing HRM information flow and its effects. Notably, Nelson (1974) differentiated search products from experience products by insisting that the quality of the former is apparent prior to purchase, while the quality of the latter is more difficult to evaluate before purchase. Wells, Valacich, and Hess (2011) further explained that signaling premises are especially persuasive in experienced goods (or products) because they are characterized by a combination of high pre-purchase information scarcity (meaning that a consumer cannot interpret a product’s quality attributes before making a purchase) and high post-purchase information clarity (meaning that a consumer can assess the quality of a product after purchase or use). HRM represents a good case of experienced goods. Pre-purchase information scarcity is especially notable in HRM because, unlike financial statements, HRM information is not officially reported (Benson, Young, & Lawler, 2006), and outside of firm home pages, individuals have very few alternative channels revealing HRM information. However, after joining firms, individuals accumulate experiences with HRM. The merits of signaling theory include that pre-purchase information scarcity and post-purchase information clarity may result in distinctive outcomes.