تاثیر تحریم ها بر تکامل همکاری در تقسیم کار خطی The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor
- نوع فایل : کتاب
- زبان : انگلیسی
- ناشر : Elsevier
- چاپ و سال / کشور: 2018
توضیحات
رشته های مرتبط اقتصاد
گرایش های مرتبط اقتصاد تولید
مجله بیولوژی تئوریکی – Journal of Theoretical Biology
دانشگاه Department of Innovation Science – Tokyo Institute of Technology – Japan
منتشر شده در نشریه الزویر
کلمات کلیدی معافیت غیرقانونی، معضل اجتماعی، مدیریت منابع مشترک، نظارت، معادله تکراری برای بازی های نامتقارن
گرایش های مرتبط اقتصاد تولید
مجله بیولوژی تئوریکی – Journal of Theoretical Biology
دانشگاه Department of Innovation Science – Tokyo Institute of Technology – Japan
منتشر شده در نشریه الزویر
کلمات کلیدی معافیت غیرقانونی، معضل اجتماعی، مدیریت منابع مشترک، نظارت، معادله تکراری برای بازی های نامتقارن
Description
Introduction Our society is based on cooperation. The evolution of cooperation remains a challenging problem from the viewpoint of not only evolutionary theory but also the social sciences: the evolution of cooperation is not an easy problem to solve. We consider the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game. Two players play the prisoner’s dilemma game and there are two types of players: cooperators and defectors. If both cooperators play the PD game, they obtain the payoff, R. If a cooperator plays the PD game with a defector, the cooperator obtains S and the defector obtains T. If both are defectors, they obtain the payoff, P. It is often assumed that the cooperator gives a benefit, b, to the opponent, incurring a cooperation cost, −c (b, c > 0), but the defector does not give anything. Therefore, T = b, R = b−c, P = 0 and S = −c. As one of the definitions satisfying the PD game is T > R > P > S, defectors obtains a greater payoff than cooperators regardless of the opponent’s type. As a result, players choose to be defectors and thus cooperation is unachievable. Therefore, previous studies on evolutionary game theory have investigated conditions whereby cooperation can evolve.
